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This paper focuses on risk premiums paid by central governments in Europe and sub-national 
governments in Germany, Spain, and Canada. With regard to the European governments, we are 
interested in how these premiums were affected by the introduction of the euro. Using data for bond yield 
spreads relative to an appropriate benchmark, for the period 1991-2005, we find that risk premiums 
incurred by central governments of EU member states respond positively to central government debts 
and deficits. This is consistent with the notion of market-imposed fiscal discipline. We find that German 
states and, among them, especially those usually receiving transfers under the German fiscal 
equalization system, enjoyed a very favourable position in the financial markets before EMU as their risk 
premiums did not respond to fiscal balances. This special status seems to have disappeared with start of 
EMU. Monetary union, therefore, imposes more fiscal discipline on German states. In contrast, Spanish 
provinces paid risk premiums related to their fiscal balances both before and after the start of EMU. Both 
German and Spanish sub-central governments paid fixed interest rate premiums over their national 
governments which became smaller after the introduction of the euro and are more likely to be interpreted 
as liquidity premiums. We also estimate empirical models of risk premiums for Canadian provinces for 
which we find financial market penalties of adverse fiscal balances and debt indicators. However, as in 
the case of Germany before EMU, those provinces that typically receive transfers under the Canadian 
fiscal equalization scheme have a more favourable bond market treatment than others. The evidence of 
market discipline at work in European government bond markets supports the notion that the no-bailout 
clause in the EU Treaty is credible.  
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
This paper investigates the risk premiums paid by central and sub-central 
governments in the European Union and by Canadian provinces for borrowing in the 
bond market. According to the market-discipline hypothesis, bond yield spreads over an 
appropriate benchmark bond signal the financial markets’ assessment of the 
sustainability of a government’s fiscal policy. Weak fiscal discipline and rising credit risk 
should be reflected in higher costs of borrowing of the government concerned compared 
to the benchmark. This mechanism may be especially important in a monetary union 
such as the European Monetary Union (EMU), where national governments no longer 
have the possibility to monetize and inflate away excessive debts. However, risk 
premiums may be much smaller or even absent in a monetary union, if the markets 
anticipate that troubled governments can turn to other member states of the union or the 
central bank for a bail-out. Thus, empirical evidence for risk premiums in the EMU 
reflects the credibility of the “no bail-out clause” in the Maastricht Treaty. 
This paper deals with bonds issued by central and sub-national governments. Using 
German federal government bonds and US Treasury bonds as the benchmarks, we first 
focus on risk premiums paid by other central governments in EMU on bonds 
denominated in either DM or Euros or US dollars. Next, we turn to the risk premiums 
paid by sub-central governments in Germany and Spain. Sub-central governments 
should be expected to pay larger risk premiums than central governments, since they 
have smaller and more mobile tax bases than central governments and, therefore, are 
more risky borrowers. Thus, finding that the yield spreads we observe for sub-central 
governments respond more strongly to measures of fiscal performance than those 
observed for central governments strengthens the interpretation of these spreads as 
risk premiums. 
An interesting and important of the German federal system is that German states, 
following a ruling by the Constitutional Court, can expect financial help from the federal 
government if they find themselves in deep financial troubles. Given such bail-out 
expectations, German states should not pay risk premiums over the German federal 
government. This may have changed with the advent of EMU, however, as the federal 
government is now restricted in its borrowing capacity by the fiscal rules of EMU, and 
may be limited its ability to deal with state fiscal crises.  6
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A second, interesting feature of German federalism is that all states participate in the 
German fiscal equalization system which guarantees all states a minimum level of 
annual tax revenues. In practice, the minimum is very close to the average and some 
states are permanent net recipients while others are permanent net contributors. Fiscal 
equalization may also affect the markets’ perception of a sub-central government’s 
credit risk, as the central government may find it hard to refuse bail-outs to states which 
are permanent net recipient of equalization grants. In view of this, we ask whether a 
state’s net position in the equalization scheme affects the risk premium it pays on its 
bonds. Since Canada has a similar equalization scheme, we also use Canadian data to 
ask a similar question regarding provincial borrowing. 
 
The econometric analysis in the paper covers the period 1991-2005. Interest rate 
spreads over central government bonds expressed in DM/euro, US dollar and Canadian 
dollar are regressed on a number of variables including the levels of fiscal balances and 
public debt. We also control for the maturity of debt, and for general investors’ risk 
aversion. Possible changes in relationships related to the introduction of the euro in 
1999 are taken into account, not only by including separate EMU dummies, but also by 
interacting these with the fiscal variables, to detect changes in interest rate responses to 
government balances and debt.   
 
The empirical results indicate than central governments of EMU member states paid 
significant risk premiums related to their fiscal performance before the start of EMU in 
1999 and continue to do so after the start of EMU. This indicates that the “no-bail-out 
clause” enjoys some credibility in the markets. Next, we find that, before the start of 
EMU, German regions, and, in particular, those that were consistently net recipients in 
the German equalization scheme, did not pay risk premiums related to their fiscal 
performance in excess of the German federal government. In contrast, net contributors 
to fiscal equalization and Spanish provinces did pay such premiums. After the start of 
EMU, however, the more favourable treatment of the former in the credit market 
vanished. This indicates that EMU may have affected Germany’s position in the 
European debt market as well, possibly due to the reduced capacity of Germany to 
borrow and print its own money in EMU.  
 7
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Turning to Canada, we find that provincial governments pay a significant risk premium 
related to their fiscal performance unless they belong to the group of net recipients 
under Canadian fiscal equalization. Together with the results for Germany, this 
suggests that, beyond their principal function of reducing inequalities within a federation, 
fiscal equalization schemes affect the credit risk of sub-central governments and, 









The potential effect of credit risk on government bond yields is an important issue for 
economists and policy makers alike. By charging risk premiums on bond yields that 
increase with government debt or deficits, financial markets can penalize governments 
for a lack of fiscal discipline, thus imposing discipline on them. Government bond yields 
would then be signals of the markets’ assessment of the sustainability of fiscal policy. 
Market-imposed discipline of this kind is especially relevant in large federal states, such 
as Canada or the US, and in monetary unions, such as the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), where governments of the member states can issue debt in 
their own right but are more restricted in their ability to respond to financial difficulties 
since they do not control their own monetary policies. Faced with a fiscal crisis, such 
governments are likely to turn to other governments or the common central bank and 
ask for a bail-out.
1 This would allow them to spread the costs of their profligate fiscal 
policies over the entire federation or monetary union. To the extent that market-imposed 
discipline leads to more prudent fiscal policies and helps prevent fiscal crises in federal 
states and monetary unions, it protects the citizens against having to pay for the 
profligacies of the governments of other states. 
In light of this, the existence of default risk premiums in sovereign bond yields has 
received a lot of attention in the debate over monetary union in Europe; see Bernoth et 
al. (2006) for a review of the literature.
  One way to detect and estimate such risk 
premiums is by considering the yield spreads of government bonds relative to a suitable 
benchmark. Following this approach, Goldstein and Woglom (1992), Bayoumi, 
Goldstein and Woglom (1995), and Poterba and Rueben (1997) show that state 
governments in the US pay risk premiums on their debt and that these premiums 
depend on indicators of fiscal performance. Lemmen (1999) shows that the yield 
spreads of bonds issued by state governments in Australia, Canada, and Germany over 
central government bond yields depend positively on the ratio of state debt to GDP. 
1 Sub-central government defaults can involve large externalities on the rest of the federation or the other members 
of a monetary union, which make it unattractive for the other states or the central government to refuse a bail-out. 
See e.g., Wildasin (2001), von Hagen et al. (2000). 9
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Booth et al. (2007) find that bond yield spreads of Canadian provinces over the federal 
government respond positively to measures of provincial indebtedness.
2  
Lonning (2000) compares the yields of a very small sample of DM issues of 11 
EU governments with equivalent German government bonds in the mid-1990s and finds 
a positive, though not always significant impact of government debt and deficits. 
Gómez-Puig (2006) uses adjusted spreads of the yields on bonds issued by 10 
European countries over DM bonds, where the adjustment uses appropriate swap rates 
to eliminate exchange rate uncertainty. She finds that the spreads increase with 
increasing debt relative to Germany.
3 Pagano and von Thadden (2004) show that 
average yield differentials of 10-year bonds issued by EMU member state governments 
relative to German 10-year bonds are positively correlated with bond ratings. Manganelli 
and Wolswijk (2007) show that spreads in euro area countries are systematically related 
to credit ratings, whereas Afonso et al (2007) provide evidence that ratings are also 
driven by budgetary developments.  
In a recent paper, Bernoth et al. (2006) analyze the spreads of yields-at-issue of 
sovereign bonds issued by EU central governments in DM (in Euros after 1999) or US 
dollars to estimate default risk premiums. The use of DM (Euro) and USD denominated 
bonds avoids the problems of exchange rate risk and different tax treatments that have 
plagued earlier studies using yields on bonds denominated in national currencies. 
Looking at yields-at-issue assures the comparability of yields at different points in time, 
since, in contrast to average yields on debt outstanding, the residual maturity is always 
the full maturity and the bonds are actively traded on the day when the yields are 
recorded. Bernoth et al. use data from before and after the start of EMU, allowing them 
to assess the impact of monetary union on bond yield spreads. Their results show that 
yield spreads respond significantly to measures of general government debt and deficits 
both before and after the start of EMU. This indicates that sovereign debt markets 
2 Balassone et al. (2004) show that yields spreads against Germany of government bonds issued by the other EU 
countries in their national currencies between 1980 and 2003 depend positively on the change in the government 
debt-to-GDP ratio. Using issues in national currencies, however, they cannot distinguish between credit risk and 
exchange rate risk, which distinction is no longer relevant in EMU. 
3 Alesina, De Broeck, Prati and Tabellini (1992) use data from 12 OECD countries and show that the differential 
between public and private bond yields is positively related to the level of public debt. In a similar vein, Lemmen 
and Goodhart (1999) and Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003) show that the differential between government bond 
yields and the corresponding swap yield of the same maturity depends positively on the level of public debt, while 
Heppke-Falk and Hüffner (2004) find that expected deficits have a positive impact on this differential in Germany, 
France, and Italy. It is not clear, however, that this differential properly reflects sovereign risk, since the credit risk 
of private issuers is likely to be correlated with the credit risk of their governments. See also Afonso and Strauch 
(2003) and Faini (2004). 10
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continue monitoring the fiscal performance of member states and exert disciplinary 
pressure on their governments.  
Furthermore, Bernoth et al. show that yield spreads are affected by liquidity 
premiums. Countries with larger market shares in the DM (Euro) or USD markets pay 
significantly lower interest rates than EU countries with smaller market shares. In the 
euro-denominated debt market, however, these liquidity premiums have vanished with 
the start of EMU, a result consistent with the empirical analysis in Pagano and von 
Thadden (2004) and Favero, Pagano, and von Thadden (2005). Finally, Bernoth et al. 
find a significant flight-to-quality effect in the sense that spreads over US government 
bond yields respond positively to an increase in the spread between low-grade US 
corporate bonds and US Treasury bonds, a proxy for the general degree of risk 
aversion in international bond markets.   
This paper extends the analysis of Bernoth et al. in several ways. First, we consider 
the response of risk premiums in central government bond yields to central rather than 
general government debts and deficits. This gives a more specific link between central 
government fiscal policy and the potential risk premium. We also control for a larger set 
of financial market variables to test for risk premiums.  
Second, by using the German federal government as the benchmark borrower, 
Bernoth et al cannot say anything about the consequences of EMU for public sector 
borrowing in Germany itself. To do this, we estimate the risk premiums on debt issued 
by German state governments, which like provinces in Canada and states in the US, 
can issue debt in their own right and have used this right extensively in the past.
4 While 
state governments have full budgetary authority over their expenditures, their ability to 
raise taxes is limited by the fact that the rates of the main taxes are set jointly by all 
states and the federal government. Furthermore, their tax bases are smaller and more 
mobile than the federal government’s tax base. As a result, one would expect state 
governments to pay risk premiums in excess of the federal government. Finding such 
premiums indeed corroborates the interpretation of the observed yield spreads as risk 
premiums related to credit risk. We also use yield spreads on bonds issued by 
provinces in Spain, the only other EMU country for which we were to find the fiscal data 
and economic data required for our empirical analysis.
5    
4 For another recent study that looks at German state government debt see Heppke Falk and Wolff (2007).  
5 While our data source includes yield spreads do exist for many regions and municipalities in other EMU member 
states, data for regional and municipal debts, deficits, and GDP do not exist. 11
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A significant feature of Germany’s federal system is that states governments can 
expect financial help from the federal government, if they find themselves in financial 
troubles. This expectation is based on a highly noticed ruling by Germany’s 
Constitutional Court in 1992. In a case brought forward by the state governments of the 
two small states of Bremen and Saarland, the Court concluded that states experiencing 
“extreme budgetary hardship” are entitled to financial support from the federation. Both 
states had issued large amounts of debt in the 1970s and 1980s, when there 
economies went into persistent decline. By the late 1980s, the servicing of these debts 
had become such a large burden on the state budgets that the governments threatened 
to cut the supply of public services dramatically. The Court ruled that the federal 
government owed the states financial aid to prevent that from happening. Financial 
markets apparently perceived this ruling as an indication of the default risk of German 
states being as low as that of the federal government, witness the fact that state 
governments have consistently received the same AAA-ratings as the federal 
government, from Fitch Ratings in recent years.
6 In our context, this implies that we 
should not find a risk premium on German state debt relative to the German federal 
government.  
However, the anticipation that German state governments will be bailed out of 
financial troubles by the federal government may have changed with the start of EMU, 
as the German federal government is now subject to the strictures of the fiscal rules in 
EMU and the scrutiny of the European Commission and the European Council, and its 
own ability to deal with fiscal crises is weaker than before monetary union. In light of 
this, we check whether a risk premium on German state debt has emerged since the 
beginning of EMU.  
Another significant feature of Germany’s federal system is that states share their tax 
revenues through a system of fiscal equalization among themselves and with the 
federal government. Under the current design of the system, some states systematically 
receive equalization payments while others always pay transfers. This suggests that 
states which are permanent recipients of funds under fiscal equalization suffer from 
persistent structural weaknesses limiting their tax capacities. Such states can hardly be 
expected to raise additional taxes in a fiscal crisis, leaving the central government with 
no alternative but to bail them out. In contrast, state governments which are permanent 
6 See www.fitchratings.com. Standard &Poor and Moody’s give German state governments ratings slightly below 
the federal government.  12
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net contributors have stronger tax capacities and may count less on bail-outs in financial 
crises, as the federal government can expect them to solve their problems by raising 
additional taxes revenues. As Rodden (2007) shows, the state governments themselves 
behave in ways consistent with this expectation. More specifically, permanent net 
contributors to the equalization system typically cut expenditures sharply in response to 
negative revenue shocks, while permanent net recipients do not. In light of this, we test 
whether or not the risk premiums paid by German state governments depend on their 
position in the fiscal equalization system.     
To pursue this last argument further, we also consider the risk premiums paid by 
Canadian provinces. Fiscal equalization is a feature of Canadian federalism, too. Its 
purpose is to guarantee provinces the financial means required to provide “reasonable 
comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation” 
(Subsection 36(2) of the Constitution Act of 1982). Like in Germany, there are provinces 
that consistently receive equalization grants and others that do not. This allows us to 
test whether their risk premiums depend on their typical position in the Canadian 
equalization scheme.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop our 
empirical approach for estimating risk premiums. In section 3, we present the data and 
estimation approach. In section 4, we report the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
  2. Risk Premiums in Government Bond Yields 
 
Consider a risk-averse investor choosing between two securities issued by two 
different governments, the “domestic” and the “foreign” government for simplicity, in the 
same currency. The investor’s rate of return on a security depends positively on the 
expected yield and negatively on the expected transaction cost the investor incurs, if, 
because of unforeseen circumstances, he has to sell the security before it matures. We 
assume that the expected transactions cost is proportional to the value of the security 
and a declining function of the liquidity of the security in the market. Taking the security 
issued by the foreign government as the benchmark in the market, we normalize the 
transactions costs related to it to zero. 
We assume that the domestic security is subject to (partial) default risk, while the 
foreign asset is considered risk-free. More specifically, the domestic government will be 
unable to fully serve its obligations with a positive probability of 1-P(xt), 0d P(xt)d1. Here, 13
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xt indicates a set of variables affecting this probability. In the case of partial default, the 
investor receives a fraction W of his gross payment, W  [0, 1 + r), where r is the interest 
rate on the domestic bond. Standard portfolio theory implies that the optimal amount 
invested in the domestic security depends positively on the yield on the domestic 
security, and negatively on the foreign yield, the domestic government’s default 
probability, a liquidity premium, and the investor’s risk premium. Furthermore, as 
Bernoth et al (2006) show, for a given supply of securities in the market, the equilibrium 
yield spread of the domestic over the foreign security depends positively on the 
domestic government’s default probability, the liquidity premium on the domestic 
security, the investor’s degree of risk aversion, and the variance of the government’s 
stochastic default process.   
These considerations lead to the following reduced form equation for the yield 
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The left-hand side variable is the yield differential between the domestic and the 
foreign security. The first term on the right-hand side reflects the yield premium over the 
benchmark due to the partial default risk. Given the expected repayment in the case of 
default, (1-Ĳt /(1+rt )), it increases with the probability of default, (1-P(xt)). The second 
term reflects the liquidity premium. The third term stems from the investor’s risk 
aversion and depends on the variance of the return on the domestic security. 
In order to derive an equation that can be estimated empirically, we need empirical 
proxies of the variables on the right hand side. The main hypothesis of interest in this 
paper is that the yield differential can be explained by indicators of fiscal performance 
relating to a government’s probability of default. Following the literature, we use two 
variables for this purpose, the ratio of government debt to GDP and the ratio of the 
government budget surplus to GDP.
7 They are measured as differences relative to the 
benchmark country. We expect that both affect the yield differential positively.  
To approximate the liquidity premium, we cannot follow the conventional approach of 
using bid-ask spreads as a measure of trading costs in securities markets (Fleming, 
2003), since our yields are yields at issue and bid-ask spreads do not exist on the first 
7 Bernoth et al. (2006) also use the ratio of government debt service to GDP as a fiscal indicator. This, however, is 
not available for all sample governments. 14
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day of trading. Gravelle (1999) shows that the correlation between bid-ask spreads and 
the total supply of debt is significantly negative. This suggests that the size of the 
market for a given security has a positive effect on its liquidity. Bernoth et al. (2006) use 
the ratio of the total debt of the issuer country denominated in the currency under 
consideration as a proxy for market size. Since these data are not available for all sub-
national governments under consideration in this study, we use the size of a debt issue 
as a proxy for its liquidity. In addition, liquidity effects may be captured by the inclusion 
of dummies reflecting whether the issuer is a central or a regional government.     
The impact of general investors' risk aversion on yield spreads between countries 
suggested by equation (1) is supported by empirical observations. Dungey et al. (2000) 
show strong evidence of a common international factor in many yield differentials. 
Copeland and Jones (2001) note that interest rate differentials between EMU member 
countries widened in periods of financial crises such as the Russian crisis in 1998 or the 
Turkish currency crisis in 2001. Similarly, Lemmen (1999) observes that the difference 
between provincial and federal yields in Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland and 
the US widened considerably after the outbreak of the Asian crisis in 1997 and the 
Russian default of August 1998. Thus, it seems that in periods of global financial crises 
or greater uncertainty investors move to safer and more liquid assets and that bond 
yield spreads increase as a result. 
Since investors’ risk aversion is not directly observable, we follow Codogno et al. 
(2003), Favero and Giavazzi (2004), and Bernoth et al (2006) and use the yield spread 
between low grade US corporate bonds (BBB) and benchmark US government bonds 
as an empirical proxy for global risk aversion.
8 Figure 1 illustrates the development of 
this proxy between 1993 and 2005. We observe that the yield spread hovered around 
130 percentage points during the early years of the 90’s. With the burst of the asset 
price bubble in 1999, and again in 2000, the spread increased sharply, illustrating the 
markets’ increasing scepticism and risk aversion in that period. After peaking in 
November 2002, the yield spread decreased continuously and reached its level of the 
early 1990s again in March 2005. 
General risk aversion may also be affected by the general level of yields offered in 
other financial markets. The financial market literature suggests that, if long-term rates 
8 A variable that measures the respective corporate bond spread for the complete euro area is not available, but the 
empirical literature on sovereign bond spreads of emerging markets shows that spreads are sensitive to US risk 
factors (see, e.g., Barnes et al. (1997), Kamin et al. (1999), Eichengreen and Mody (2000)). Therefore, data on US 
corporate-government bond yield spreads can be used as a good proxy for the overall investors' risk attitude. 15
ECB
Working Paper Series No 879
March 2008
are generally low compared to short-term rates, investors ask for lower risk premiums 
as they are eager to find investment opportunities offering attractive spreads over short-
term interest rates. This suggests including a short-term interest rate or the spread 
between a long-term and a short-term interest rate in the relevant currency market as 
additional proxies for investors’ risk aversion. 
Furthermore, we include the time to maturity of the bonds at the time of issue as 
additional control related to the investors’ risk premium, since our sample contains 
issues of different maturities. It controls for the possibility that investors receive a 
compensation for investing in long-term bonds instead of buying short-term bonds and 
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In equation (2), ȕ0 and Ȗ are scalar parameters and ȕ1 is a vector of parameters. rit is 
the yield at issue of a security issued by government i at time t and rjt the yield at issue 
of a security issued by the benchmark government j at the same time. zit is a vector 
containing the fiscal indicators, our measure of issue size, the short-term interest rate, 
and the years to maturity. The variable st is the corporate spread from figure 1. Finally, 
İijt is a stochastic error term.  
In this paper, we are particularly interested in the yield spreads on sub-national 
government debt. There is a number of reasons why sub-national governments may 
pay risk premiums in excess of those paid by central governments. First, their tax 
capacity is typically smaller than that of central governments, as central governments 
usually own the revenues from the most important taxes, such as income taxes and 
VAT. Even if sub-national governments own (shares) of these taxes, they may, as in 
Germany, be restricted in their authority to change tax rates and, therefore, in their 
ability to react to revenue and spending shocks. Second, sub-national governments 
face a much more mobile tax base for most taxes except real estate taxes, which further 
restricts their ability to raise additional revenues in case of fiscal crises. Third, central 
governments can, in principle, use monetary policy to inflate away excessive debts 
issued in domestic currency. While this does not hold for debt issued in foreign 
currency, it still reduces the likelihood of default on foreign currency debt. These 16
ECB
Working Paper Series No 879
March 2008
considerations suggest that sub-national governments should pay larger risk premiums 
than central governments. 
At the same time, there may also be risk-alleviating effects in favor of sub-central 
governments. The first is an (explicit or implicit) commitment of the central government 
to bail out sub-national governments in fiscal crises. If such a commitment exists, a sub-
national government should pay the same risk premium as its central government. In 
addition, Germany and Canada have explicit mechanisms of fiscal equalization, i.e., 
arrangements for sharing tax revenues among the states or provinces. Such 
arrangements provide some insurance against state or province-specific shocks. Since, 
in these two countries, there are some states which always receive transfers through 
these systems and others which always pay in, one may expect that the risk-alleviating 
function is particularly important for those which are always net recipients. 
In view of these considerations, we include in equation (2) a set of dummy variables 
SUBk, for sub-central governments, where SUBk,i = 1, if government i is a sub-central 
government in country k, and zero otherwise; see equation (3). We use these dummy 
variables as additional intercepts and interactively with the other determinants of the 
yield spreads. The coefficient ĳ0 indicates the average extra premium charged on sub-
central government debt, while the coefficients ĳ1 on the interactive term indicate any 
differences in the reaction of the yield spread of sub-national governments to changes 
in the relevant right-hand-side variable compared to the reaction of the yield spread of 
central governments. The total reaction of the yield spread of sub-national governments 
is the sum of the coefficients on the right-hand-side variable and the interactive term. 
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At the start of EMU in 1999, all public debt of the EMU member states that had 
previously been issued in national currencies or the currency of another EMU member 
state (DM) was converted into euros. This had two major implications in the context of 
this study. First, this debt was denominated in a currency the issue of which was not 
controlled by the individual member governments. From this perspective, euro-
denominated central government debt has the same properties as debt issued in 
national currency by a sub-national government. National governments can no longer 17
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use national monetary policies to inflate away excessive debts.
9 This should increase 
the credit risk of central governments in EMU. However, euro-denominated debt is 
different from foreign-currency debt in that the government of a EMU member state 
receives its tax revenues in euros, i.e., the same currency its obligations are 
denominated in. In national currency systems, fiscal crises typically come with large 
devaluations of the domestic currency. This implies that it is even harder for a 
government hit by a crises to serve its foreign-currency obligations, which adds to the 
risk of default. Since this adverse exchange rate effect vanishes in EMU, the risk-
premium on euro-denominated debt may also be lower than the premium on foreign-
currency debt before EMU. Finally, financial markets may well perceive that 
governments of EMU member states faced with fiscal crises would receive financial 
assistance from other EMU member states or the ECB, as a default of a member state 
government might damage the euro-area financial system and the international 
reputation of the common currency.
10 Such a perception would also tend to reduce the 
risk premium on government debt.  
The second implication of the conversion of all public debt into euros concerns 
the liquidity of securities markets, as a common currency increases the substitutability 
of government bonds of different countries and, hence, market size. This should lead to 
a decline in liquidity premiums. This is consistent with the evidence for interest rate 
convergence in the market for public debt in the euro area, see, e.g., Pagano and von 
Thadden (2004).  
In sum, the effects of EMU on the yield spreads on government bonds are 
ambiguous and deserve empirical analysis.
11 To investigate them, we augment our 
model as follows:   
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9 Even prior to EMU, this option did not exist for foreign-currency debt, either. Nevertheless, governments could 
have used surprise inflations to reduce the burden of debt issued in national currencies in order to improve their 
abilities to service their foreign debt. Thus, the introduction of the euro may have consequences for foreign-currency 
issued as well. 
10 While the Treaty on European Union explicitly rules out bail-outs of excessively indebted governments, it is not 
clear whether this rule should be interpreted as an outright ban on any financial assistance.   
11 Note that the anticipation of EMU may have affected yield spreads in years prior to EMU. If so, our specification 
tends to underestimate the true effects. Due to the nature of our data, however, we cannot estimate a dynamic model 
incorporating expectations effects. 18
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In equation (4), EMU is a dummy variable which is one for EMU member states after 
1998 and zero otherwise. The coefficient į0 indicates the effect of EMU on the level of 
the yield spread, while the coefficients į1 indicate any changes in the slope parameters 
occurring after 1998. The total effect of the right-hand-side variables on the yield spread 




3. Data and Estimation 
We analyse the spreads of foreign currency-denominated central government 
bond issues of 13 European countries and sub-central governments of Germany, Spain 
and Canada between 1991 and the beginning of 2005. The data are provided by Capital 
Data Bondware, now part of Dealogic Group.
13 As documented in Bernoth et al (2006), 
the majority of foreign-currency bond issues by EU governments prior to 1999 were in 
either DM or USD. We use euro-denominated instead of DM-denominated issues after 
the beginning of EMU in 1999, as German federal government bonds continue to be the 
benchmark bond in the euro bond market. We use US treasury bonds and Canadian 
central government bonds as the benchmark bonds in the other two markets. We 
selected all issues for which Capital Data Bondware reports an appropriate benchmark 
yield. The yield spread is measured in basis points and is based on the difference in the 
yield to maturity at the time of issue between the national bond under consideration and 
a benchmark bond with the same maturity and coupon payment structure.
14 We rely 
entirely on Capital Data Bondware to identify the appropriate benchmark security. This 
implies that our sample does not include all foreign currency (and euro) issues by the 
sample governments during the period under consideration. It assures, however, that 
we do not introduce mistakes by trying to identify benchmarks ourselves.  
12 Canzoneri et al. (2002) argue that is it important to condition on the stance of monetary policy when estimating 
the effects of fiscal policy on interest rates, as monetary policy might react to fiscal policy. Our use of yield spreads 
on foreign currency issues makes this point less relevant, as it seems much less likely that the central bank of the 
currency of issue would react to the fiscal policy of a different country. The ECB has often stated that it does not 
react to the fiscal policies of individual EMU member states. In view of this, we do not include a measure of the 
monetary policy stance in the model. 
13 The precise starting and final year of the data differs per country/region depending on availability of budgetary 
data.  
14 Capital Data Bondware defines equivalence as meaning that the benchmark bond is similar to the government 
bond under consideration with respect to the time of issuance, the coupon payment structure, the underlying 
currency, and the time to maturity.19
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The number of bond issues under consideration, sorted by issuing party and by 
currency of issuance, is reported in Table 1. We have total of 555 foreign currency 
issues for which we have an appropriate benchmark bond. Of these, 163 issues are in 
USD, 281 in DM or euros, and 111 in Canadian dollars. For each currency, about half of 
the issues are from the time before the start of EMU. There are 283 central government 
bonds and 272 sub-national government issues. Among the 13 EU central 
governments, Austria issued the most foreign-currency denominated bonds during the 
period under consideration (57), followed by Denmark (42), Sweden (41) and Italy (40). 
Only the governments of France and Luxembourg did not issue foreign currency bonds 
during that period.  
Turning to sub-national governments, most issues are by German states. Among 
them, North Rhine- Westphalia (24) tops the list in Germany, followed by Saxony-Anhalt 
(21) and the city of Berlin (20).. In Spain, most issuances are by the region of Andalucia 
(5). In Canada, finally, Ontario is the main provincial issuer (29), followed by British 
Columbia (16) and Quebec (8). We could not use foreign currency issues of other sub-
national governments in the EU since appropriate data for the fiscal indicators do not 
exist.  
Data on the budgetary variables come from various sources. Central government 
variables include the budget balance-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP ratios as provided by 
Eurostat (fiscal balance) and the OECD (debt). Data on budget balances and debt in 
German states are taken from the German Statistical Office. Budgetary data on 
Canadian provinces, following national definitions, are taken from the Canadian 
Department of Finance. As to the debt measure for Canadian provinces, we used 
outstanding bonds as an (imperfect) measure of their total gross debt as well as total 
liabilities, which is conceptually more similar to the gross debt data used for the 
European governments. Budgetary data on Spanish regions are from the Banco 
d’España and the Spanish National Statistical Institute. Note that the regional statistics 
may be based on somewhat different definitions of the deficit and public debt than for 
central government (see annex 1 for further details on the data and their sources) 
Table 2 provides some summary statistics. Yield spreads range between zero 
and 132 basis points for central governments and average about 36 basis points. 
Minimum spreads are slightly higher for sub-national governments. Average spreads 
are larger for sub-national governments than for national governments in Canada and 
Spain, but not in Germany. Figure 2 shows the yield spreads on bonds issued by the 20
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sub-national governments in Germany and Canada, and by the 13 EU central 
governments, plotted against their fiscal balance ratio differences. The figure indicates 
that the fiscal balance ratios of sub-national governments are more or less 
symmetrically distributed around those of the benchmark countries. In contrast, central 
government fiscal balances are more often less favourable than those of the central 
governments of the benchmark countries as witnessed by negative values on the x-axis. 
Another noteworthy difference is that, with few exceptions, spreads of German states 
are below 60 basis points, while for Canadian provinces and EU central governments 
yield spreads are often larger. Finally, the data show some correlation between the 
spread and the fiscal balances for central governments but, at first sight, less obviously 
so for Canadian and German regions.    
Pre-testing estimates of equation (4) for DM/Euro, USD, and Can$ issues 
separately show that we can pool the data for the former two markets, as the slope 
coefficients from these estimates were not significantly different. This is similar to the 
results in Bernoth et al (2006). In contrast, we have to estimate the model for yield 
differentials in the Can$ market separately. In the model for Can$ issues, we drop the 
EMU related terms. We use OLS for the estimation and include time fixed effects to 
capture the impact of common trends, business cycles and other unobserved factors. 
15 
 
  4.  Empirical Results  
  Table 3 reports our empirical results for DM/Euro and USD issues. Column A 
uses data only for EU central governments. It shows that yield spreads over the 
benchmark bonds depend significantly and positively on the ratio of central government 
debt to GDP and the central government budget balance over GDP. A central 
government with a debt ratio exceeding Germany’s ratio by 10 percent pays 2.6 basis 
points more on its debt than the benchmark government. A government running a 
budget deficit exceeding the benchmark government’s deficit by one percent of GDP 
pays about 4 basis points more on its debt than the benchmark government. Both 
coefficients are strongly statistically significant, indicating that markets do consider 
governments’ fiscal performance when pricing their bonds. While the implied risk 
premiums may seem economically small, one has to keep in mind that the coefficients 
reflect the impact of the debt and the budget balance ratios on the perceived likelihood 
15  The time-fixed effects run from 1992 to 2003. We do not include country fixed effects as this would eliminate 
much of the variation in fiscal data.   21
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of default and the expected repayment in case of partial default, and that the latter could 
still be relatively large; see equation (1). 
Since the size of the individual issue did not appear significantly in the 
regressions, we do not report the coefficients on this variable. Thus, we cannot account 
for liquidity premiums explicitly. Table 3 also shows that adding a year to the maturity of 
a bond relative to the benchmark raises the yield spread by almost one basis point. We 
find significant effects of international risk aversion as reflected by the corporate spread 
variable only in the USD-denominated market. This is consistent with a similar finding in 
Bernoth et al. (2006). Similarly, we find that the monetary policy stance in the 
benchmark country as reflected in the short-term interest rate has a significant effect 
only in the USD-denominated market. Neither the constant nor the dummy for USD-
denominated issues are statistically significant. 
The table shows that the coefficient on the EMU-dummy is negative, pointing to a 
small, general reduction in yield spreads compared to the DM-denominated market, but 
it is not statistically significant. However, the slope parameters for central government 
debt and the budget balance change significantly with the start of EMU. This is indicated 
by the coefficients on the terms interacting the EMU dummy with the fiscal variables. 
The effect of the debt ratio on the yield spread almost disappears with the introduction 
of the euro. The effect of the general government balance on the yield spread becomes 
significantly smaller. As noted above, this may be due to the more favourable risk profile 
of euro-denominated debt compared to foreign currency debt and does not necessarily 
reflect bail-out expectations in EMU. 
Column B in Table 3 repeats the same estimate dropping the insignificant terms 
involving the corporate spread, the short-term interest rate, and the dummy for USD-
denominated issues. The results are unchanged. A Wald test of the hypothesis that the 
sum of the slope coefficients on the government debt ratio is zero is not rejected. We 
report this and the following tests in Table 4. Accordingly, the effect of the debt ratio on 
risk premiums disappears in the euro-denominated market. In contrast, a Wald test of 
the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients on the central government balance is 
zero is rejected, see Table 4. Assuming that the expected repayment rate, Ĳ, in case of 
partial default is unchanged, this suggests that markets price fiscal risk less than before 
the start of EMU, but still in a statistically significant way. An EU government running a 
deficit of one percent in excess of Germany’s deficit saves roughly 2 basis points in the 
interest payment on its debt since the start of EMU.  22
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In column C, we report the estimate of the same model adding Spanish and 
German sub-national government bonds to the sample. German State governments 
paid a fixed premium of about 26 basis points over the benchmark bond, while Spanish 
provincial governments paid a much larger fixed premium of over 70 basis points. The 
interaction of the subcentral government dummies with the EMU dummy shows that 
these fixed premiums fell significantly after the introduction of the euro. This may reflect 
primarily the fact that, in the much greater euro-denominated debt market, liquidity is 
larger than in the DM-denominated market. Interacting the debt ratios with subcentral 
government ratios [not clear what is interacted with what here] did not yield significant 
results, therefore, these terms were dropped from the regression.  
For the German State, the slope coefficient on the budget balance is significantly 
larger than for the central governments, but this effect is eliminated after the introduction 
of the euro, as indicated by the term interacted with the EMU dummy. For Spanish 
regions, the slope coefficients on the budget balance are not statistically significant. 
Column D reports the results of estimating the same model as in C, but dropping 
the extra fiscal balance terms for the Spanish regions. The results in the upper part of 
Table 3 remain unchanged compared to column B, indicating that adding the sub-
central government bonds does not change the previously discussed results concerning 
maturity,, global risk aversion, and the stance of monetary policy in the USD-
denominated market.  
Table 4 indicates that the parameter tests regarding the debt and fiscal balance 
ratios of central governments remain unchanged. This table also shows that the sum of 
the coefficients on the balance ratio and the balance ratio interacted with the dummy for 
German State is not statistically different from zero. Furthermore, the sum of the slope 
coefficients on budget balances for German States with and without EMU is not 
statistically different from zero. Taken together, these results indicate, first, that German 
States had a privileged position in the debt market before the start of EMU, in that they 
paid no premium related to any differences between their fiscal balances at all. Markets 
seem to have paid no attention to the soundness of their fiscal positions. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that markets expected State governments to be bailed 
out by the Federal government in the case of a fiscal crisis. Furthermore, our results 
indicate that this expectation vanished after the introduction of the euro. As the German 
Federal government is now restricted in its ability to issue debt due to the fiscal 
framework of EMU, markets may perceive that bailouts have become unlikely.  23
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Next, we ask whether a state’s position in Germany’s fiscal equalization system 
affects the markets’ bailout expectations. Specifically, we ask whether States that are 
consistently net recipients of the Federal equalisation system are treated differently 
compared to those that are consistently net contributors. For this purpose, consider 
columns E and F in Table 3, where we differentiate between net contributors and net 
recipients. The table shows that, for net contributing states, the slope coefficient on the 
budget balance is only weakly significantly positive before the start of EMU and not 
significantly different from zero thereafter. For net recipient states, in contrast, both 
slope coefficients are highly significant and the pattern detected in column C is 
confirmed. We conclude that the special treatment before the start of EMU was indeed 
reserved for states which are net recipients. 
To investigate the effects of fiscal equalization on risk premiums further, we now 
turn to the other large federation in our sample with an explicit equalization scheme, 
Canada. Table 5 reports the results for Canadian provinces. Lacking Canadian data for 
provincial gross debt that are comparable to those for European (sub-national) 
governments, we use two alternative definitions of government debt for the Canadian 
federal and provincial governments, namely total securities outstanding (columns A, C, 
and D) and total gross liabilities (columns B, E, and F). The latter includes non-
securitized debt such as bank loans. Columns A and B use debt and deficits relative to 
the federal government as explanatory variables together with the corporate spread and 
the time to maturity. The positive and significant coefficients on the debt ratio suggest 
that Canadian provinces pay a risk premium of approximately 0.30 basis points for 
every percentage point their debt ratios increase relative to the federal government’s 
debt ratio. The significant and negative coefficients on the balance ratio indicate that the 
risk premium also responds positively to an increase in the deficit relative to the federal 
government. As in the European case, the risk premium responds significantly to 
changes in investors’ risk aversion as reflected in the corporate bond spread. Finally, 
premiums increase with longer maturities, but the effect is not statistically significant. 
These results are broadly consistent with Booth et al. (2007).
16 Using total gross 
liabilities as the debt variable yields similar results and a slightly higher R-squared. 
Canadian fiscal equalization is characterized by the fact that the three largest 
provinces, Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario, never receive equalization grants, 
16 Note that Booth et al (2007) use a less precise measure of interest rate spreads, namely spreads computed from 
average yields on government bonds outstanding. 24
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while the others, Manitoba, New Foundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, 
Quebec, and Saskatchewan, always do (see Table A1). During the 1990s, equalization 
grants on average amounted to about 14 percent of the receiving provinces’ own 
revenues, but to 49 percent for New Foundland.
17 Among the receiving provinces, there 
is a group of small ones consisting of New Foundland, Prince Edward Island, and Nova 
Scotia, and a group of medium-sized ones, i.e., Manitoba, Quebec, and Saskatchewan. 
To see how the position in fiscal equalization affects the risk premium, column C adds 
intercept and interactive slope dummies for these two groups of receiving provinces. A 
first result from this is that the coefficient on the debt ratio loses statistical significance. It 
even obtains a negative sign when we use total debt outstanding as the measure of 
indebtedness. This suggests a strong correlation between the dummy for small and 
medium-sized recipient provinces and the debt ratio. In fact, a regression of the debt 
ratio on a constant and a dummy each for the two groups shows a strongly significant, 
positive relationship, see Table 6. The coefficients in this regression give the average 
debt ratios for these three groups in the sample, i.e., small and medium-sized recipient 
provinces and large, non-recipient provinces. The left panel of the table shows that 
small provinces have the largest debt ratios, followed by medium-sized provinces and 
large provinces. The right panel of the table shows that a similar statistically significant 
correlation between provincial size and the fiscal balance ratios does not exist. 
While the debt ratio thus loses significance, the intercept dummy for small 
recipient provinces is positive and significant, showing that these provinces pay higher 
risk premiums than large provinces in Canada. The intercept dummy for the medium-
sized recipient provinces is not significant. We interpret the intercept dummy for the 
small provinces as a liquidity premium on the debt issued by small provinces, since it is 
not related to fiscal performance. The interactive dummies for small and medium-sized 
provinces on the debt ratio are not statistically significant. In contrast, the interactive 
slope dummies on the fiscal balance ratios are positive for both groups of recipient 
provinces and highly statistically significant for the small recipient provinces. The 
coefficient for the medium-sized provinces is only marginally significant. Furthermore, 
they are of similar magnitude and of similar absolute value compared to the slope 
coefficient on the fiscal balance which now measures the effect of the fiscal balances on 
the risk premium paid by large provinces. A Chi-square test shows that the Null 
17 Standing Senate Committee on National Finance (2002).  25
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hypothesis that this slope coefficient coefficients and each coefficients of the interactive 
dummies on the fiscal balance sum to zero cannot be rejected. Thus, small and 
medium-sized provinces receiving equalization grants do not pay a risk premium on 
their debt related to their fiscal performance relative to the Canadian government. 
Column C also shows that a dummy variable for Quebec, included to reflect financial 
markets’ assessment of a pursuit for more autonomy, is not statistically significant. 
Hence, we drop it together with the interactive dummy on the debt ratio as we move 
from column C to column D. Column D also restricts the interactive dummy on the fiscal 
balance to be the same for small and medium-sized recipient provinces. Column E uses 
gross liabilities as the measure of debt. There results are again very similar. Finally, in 
column E we restrict the slope coefficient on the fiscal balance to be the same for large 
and for medium-sized recipient provinces. The drop in the adjusted R-square shows 
that this results in a loss of explanatory power for the same number of parameters, 
leaving us with columns C and D as the preferred versions of the regressions.   
In sum, the empirical results indicate that provinces which are expected to 
receive transfers under fiscal equalization are not punished by financial markets for 
incurring larger deficits. This result closely resembles our findings for German States 
prior to EMU. It indicates that fiscal institutions such as equalization have significant 
financial market effects generating financial benefits for the recipient sub-central 
governments.   
             
  5. Conclusions 
 
  This paper extends recent empirical work on sovereign risk premiums in 
European bond markets to sub-national governments in Germany, Spain, and Canada. 
We find that yield spreads over appropriate benchmark bonds depend significantly on 
indicators of fiscal performance. This is consistent with the notion of sovereign risk 
premiums for (partial) defaults. We find such risk premiums both before and after the 
start of EMU, although their nature and magnitude has changed somewhat.  
  German states enjoyed a particularly favourable position in the financial markets 
before EMU. Based on the investors’ anticipation that the federal government would bail 
out financially troubled states, they did not pay risk premiums related to their fiscal 
deficits. The evidence suggests that this benefit accrued especially to states that usually 
receive transfers under the German fiscal equalization scheme. However, this special 26
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status has disappeared with EMU. Thus, monetary union has increased the market 
pressure for fiscal discipline on German states. We also consider the risk premium paid 
by Spanish provinces and find that they did not receive a similar, favourable treatment 
as German states before the start of EMU. Since then, markets treat them similarly to 
German states. These findings are also interesting from the perspective of fiscal 
institutions: The evidence presented in this paper supports the notion of credibility of the 
no-bailout clause in the EU Treaty while the bail out expectation for German States 
appears to have lost perceived importance. 
  Pursuing our investigation into the effects of fiscal equalization on risk premiums 
paid by lower-level governments, we estimate similar models for Canadian provinces. 
Here, too, we find that the position of a provincial government in the fiscal equalization 
scheme makes a significant difference. Large Canadian provinces, which never receive 
equalization grants, are generally penalised for running large budget deficits. However, 
markets do not penalize provinces that consistently receive transfers under the 
Canadian fiscal equalization system for running large deficits. This suggests that 
markets expect the Canadian government to provide financial assistance to the 
governments of these provinces should a financial crisis occur, a result which is similar 
to our findings for German states before the start of EMU. The fact that large provinces 
have significantly lower debt levels than provinces receiving equalization grants 
provides prima-facie evidence that fiscal discipline as imposed by financial markets can 
be effective. Our results for Germany and Canada suggest that, beyond their principal 
function of reducing inequalities within a federation, fiscal equalization schemes affect 
the credit risk of sub-central governments and, therefore, allow recipient states to 
borrow at more favourable terms than others. 
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Annex: list of variables and their sources: 
 
Bond size = issue size of the bond issued, in mln euro. Source: Capital DATA 
Bondware. 
Corporate spread (BBB spread) = difference between 7 -10 year BBB-rated US 
corporate bonds (BBB) and 7 - 10 year US benchmark government. Source: 
Merrill Lynch. 
Debt: 
  Canadian provinces: gross direct government debt (excluding guarantees). 
Source: Bank of Canada, Banking and Financial Statistics, K8 tables: Gross 
amount of bonds outstanding. 
 and 
  total outstanding liabilities. Source: Statistics Canada, Balance sheet of federal, 
provincial and territorial general and local governments, tables 385-0014. 
  EU Central governments: OECD, Central Government Debt, statistical yearbook, 
1980-2005. 
  German states: Credit market debt plus loans for cash-flow improvement. Not 
inclusive of hospitals with commercial accounting. Source: Federal Statistical 
Office Germany. 2005 data are provisional.   
Spanish provinces: Banco d’España 
Deficit:  
Canadian region: Public account of Provincial and Territorial governments, 
department of finance, Canada (fiscal reference table no. 5). Fiscal year numbers 
have been allocated to the calendar year in which the largest part of the fiscal year 
falls (e.g. 2004/2005 is allocated to 2004). 
EU Central governments: Eurostat, net lending of central governments 
  German provinces: Deficit on an ESA-basis. Source: Federal Statistical Office 
Germany. 
  Spanish provinces: Banco d’España 
Short-term interest rate:  
Canada: 1 month Canada treasury bill rates. Source: Datastream 
  US: 3 month US$ Libor rate. Source: Reuters 
  DM/euro: 3 month FIBOR, replaced on 1 January 1999 by the 3 month EURIBOR 
rate. Source: Datastream  
Spread = difference in the yield to maturity at the time of issue between the 
national/regional bond and an equivalent government bond issued in the same 
currency by the government of the issue-currency. Source: Capital DATA 
Bondware 
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Table 1. Bond issues selected by issuer government and by currency 
 USD  DM/EUR  Can  $  Total 
EU central 
governments 
69/84   47/63  3/17 119/164 
Spanish 
regions 
6/2    2/2  -  8/4 
German  states  0/2 33/134 0/1 33/137 
Canadian 
provinces 
- -  42/48  42/48 
Total 
 
75/88 82/199 45/66  202/353 
  Note: The first entry is the number of issues until December 1998, the second 
entry the number of issues after 1 January 1999. 
Table 2. Summary statistics of interest spreads and budgetary variables per 
issuing government country/region 




   Germany  Canada  Spain     
Min. 1.3 10.0 18.0 0.0  0.0
Avg. 22.6 38.2 63.1 35.6  32.7
Interest spread 
Max. 92.0 131.0 123.0 132.0  132.0
Min. -4.9 -5.8 -1.1 -10.8  -10.8
Avg. -0.0 0.2 1.8 -1.5  -0.8
Fiscal balance 
ratio  
  Max. 2.2 4.3 7.3 6.4  7.3
Min. -30.6 -65.9 -46.0 -59.8  -65.9
Avg. -4.1 -38.3 -32.2 34.5  9.4
Debt ratio  
Max. 31.7 -5.9 -14.5 98.2  98.2
Note: The deficit and debt ratio variables are the differences of the deficit and the debt-to-GDP ratios of 
the issuer country/region and the benchmark country. The benchmark issuer is the central government of 
the country in whose currency the bond is issued, i.e., Germany, the US or Canada. A positive number 
implies that deficit ratios are lower (or surplus ratios higher) than that of the benchmark issuer, 
respectively that debt ratios are higher than that of the benchmark issuer.  32
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Table 3: Regression Results for DM (Euro) and USD Issues  
Explanatory  Variable  (A) (B) (C) (D)
Public  debt  0.26*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 
p-value  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Fiscal balance  -3.80***  -3.83*** -3.36*** -3.44*** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Time  to  Maturity  0.92*** 0.89*** 1.05*** 1.11*** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
BBB spread  -0.03    
p-value  (0.72)
Short-rate  0.84    
p-value  (0.56)    
Size  -0.001    
p-value  (0.32)    
BBB spread*US  0.25***  0.21*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Short-rate*US -2.07  -2.44** -2.80*** -2.72*** 
p-value (0.32)  (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 8.55  3.57  0.06*  -0.50*** 
p-value (0.56)  (0.48)  (0.98) (.85) 
USD-dummy  -8.84    
p-value  (0.55)
EMU Effects 
EMU-dummy -0.76  -1.47 -0.44 -0.50 
p-value (0.88)  (0.76)  (0.91) (0.90) 
Public debt*EMU  -0.21*  -0.24** -0.26*** -0.26*** 
p-value (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Fiscal  balance*EMU 2.22**  2.02** 1.59 1.59 
p-value (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)** (0.04) 
German Länder 
Constant     25.88*** 25.92*** 
p-value     (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant*EMU     -19.68** -19.53** 
p-value     (0.00) (0.00) 
Fiscal  balance     4.29*** 4.42*** 
p-value     (0.00) (0.00) 
Fiscal balance*EMU    -4.20**  -4.29*** 
p-value     (0.01) (0.00) 
Spanish Regions 
Constant     70.85*** 66.99*** 
p-value     (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant*EMU     -29.16** -35.24** 
p-value     (0.03) (0.00) 
Fiscal  balance     -2.04  
p-value     (0.39)  
Fiscal  balance*EMU     -5.79  
p-value     (0.34)  
NOBS  263 263 444 444 
R
2  adjusted  0.63 0.62 0.67 0.67 
      
Note: Stars (*, **, and ***) indicate significance of the coefficients on 10, 5 and 1% significance 
 levels. P-value indicates the significance level of rejecting the Null that a coefficient is zero. 33
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Table 3 continued
Explanatory Variable  (E)  (F) 
Public debt  0.28***  0.27*** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.00) 
Fiscal balance  -3.44***  -3.22*** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.00) 
Time to Maturity  1.11***  1.09*** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.00) 
BBB spread*US  0.23***  0.23*** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.00) 
Short-rate*US -2.72***  -2.71*** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.00) 
Constant -0.35  -0.78 
p-value (0.93)  (0.86) 
EMU Effects
EMU-dummy  -0.48 
p-value   (0.90) 
Public debt*EMU  -0.26*** -0.25*** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.00) 
Fiscal balance*EMU  1.59**  1.36* 
p-value  (0.04) (0.07) 
German Länder
Net contributors
Constant 26.99***  32.88*** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.00) 
Constant*EMU -19.41**  -25.71** 
p-value (0.01)  (0.00) 
Fiscal balance  3.46*   
p-value (0.08)   
Fiscal balance*EMU  -4.53   
p-value (0.12)   
Net Recipients
Constant 26.90***  26.04*** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.00) 
Constant*EMU -20.58***  -19.49** 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) 
Fiscal balance  4.99***  4.59*** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.00) 
Fiscal balance*EMU -4.72**  -4.19** 
p-value (0.01)  (0.02) 
Spanish Regions
Constant 66.72***  64.84*** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.00) 
Constant*EMU -34.87***  -32.64** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.00) 
    
   v 
 444  444 
 0.67  0.67 34
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Table 4: Hypothesis Tests 
Model B  C D E F
Hypothesis       
No reaction to public debt in EMU  0.70  0.72  0.76  0.72  0.70 
No reaction to fiscal balance in EMU  0.02  0.005  0.001  0.001  0.001 
German States no reaction to fiscal balance before EMU    0.32  0.29  0.19  0.25 
No discrimination in favour of German States in EMU    0.93  0.90  0.84  0.75 
Pre-EMU constant equal for all German States          0.20 
EMU constant equal for all German States          0.082 
EMU effect equal for German States and Spanish regions          0.52 
Note: Entries in this table show the significance levels at which the relevant hypothesis is 
rejected.35
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Table 5: Results for Canadian Provinces 
 A B C D E F
Public  debt 0.46*** 0.32*** -0.40 0.14 0.09  0.09
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.22) (0.20) (0.24) 
Fiscal  balance  -4.34 -4.36*** -8.95*** -6.43*** -6.39*** -6.46***
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Small Recipient 
Provinces
Constant   37.87** 16.96*** 17.29***  17.32***
p-value  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)
Public debt    0.26  
p-value  (0.54)  
Fiscal balance    7.96***   5.24***




Constant   24.31  
p-value    (0.16)   
Public debt    0.35  
p-value  (0.46)  
Fiscal balance   7.15  
p-value  (0.11)  
All  Recipient 
Provinces
Fiscal Balance   7.14 5.53*** 5.50***   
p-value  (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) 
Time  to  maturity 0.38 0.35 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.16
p-value (0.33) (0.38) (0.53) (0.62) (0.64) (0.64)
BBB  spread 0.12 0.10 0.12* 0.15** 0.14**  0.12*
p-value (0.15) (0.22) (0.10) (0.04) (0.05) (0.10)
Quebec   -2.46  
p-value  (0.73)  
C   47.81*** 21.85 47.06*** 40.71*** 45.11***
p-value  (0.00) (0.29) (0.0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Debt  measure Securities Liabilities Securities Securities Liabilities Liabilities
Time  fixed  effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
NOBS 90 90 90 90 90 90
R
2  adjusted 0.76 0.75 0.85 0.83 0.83 0.82
Stars (*, **, and ***) indicate significance of the coefficients at 10, 5 and 1 significance levels 36
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Table 6: Average Public Debt and Fiscal Balance Ratios in Canada by Size 
Dependent variable Public debt ratio  Fiscal balance ratio
Small recipient provinces 71.82***  0.49
p-value (0.00) (0.33)
Medium-sized recipient provinces 63.88***  0.29
p-value (0.00) (0.40)
Large provinces 36.77***  0.05
p-value (0.00) (0.87)
R
2  0.63 0.00
Note: Public debt measure is total gross liabilities. Stars (*, **, and ***) indicate significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1% significance levels 









1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
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